The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal-related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. The first concerns the relevance of non-epistemic factors we might call "future-comparative" – e.g., that you’ll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. ![]() It is also common to claim that only epistemic factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes, i.e., only factors that bear on how strongly or weakly placed one is epistemically with respect to the question at issue. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. more Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. In a final section, I use the defeat-related difference between inferential and noninferential justification to argue that there is less noninferential perceptual or testimonial justification than is commonly thought.Įpistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, d. This difference in defeaters has important implications, and even uses, in epistemology. I try to explain why there should be this difference. However, I agree with Sturgeon that for noninferential justification, the Pollockian account is in trouble. I argue that in the case of defeat of inferential justification, undercutting defeat is a genuine phenomenon and takes roughly the shape Pollock suggests, not needing help from higher-order beliefs or justifications. Sturgeon concludes that Pollock misconceives undercutting defeat. Unlike the latter, undercutting defeat, Sturgeon claims, occurs only in conjunction with certain higher-order contributions, i.e., with beliefs about the basis on which one does or would believe. While not questioning the existence of undercutting defeat, Scott Sturgeon argues that undercutting defeat operates differently from rebutting. Recently, however, cracks have appeared in the consensus, particularly on the understanding of undercutting defeat. more Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock's framework for defeat is now part of the received wisdom in analytic epistemology. Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock's framework for defeat is now part.
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